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In this response, Nicola Lacey enters into dialogue with the symposium contributors, 
identifying and commenting on some of the key themes which they have raised about the 
treatment of criminal responsibility in her book.  These include the problematization of 
progress narratives; criminal law’s capacity to counter – and to reinforce -inequality; the 
scope for further development of gender and comparative analysis; the appropriate degree of 
contextualization; and the relationship between historical interpretation and philosophical 
analysis in the methodology of criminal law theory. 
 
It is one of the highest privileges of scholarship to have one’s work the subject of serious 
critical engagement. Where that engagement comes from distinguished colleagues, and is 
framed in thoughtful and generous terms, the privilege is all the greater. I am, accordingly, 
exceptionally grateful to the contributors to, and editors of, this symposium on my book, In 
Search of Criminal Responsibility.1 Reviews, of course, come in many forms, and can 
accordingly contribute to the enterprise pursued by a book in a number of different ways: 
contextualizing and drawing out themes which are implicit in a text, and which the author 
herself may not have fully explored or even been entirely aware of; identifying gaps and 
silences which invite further development; identifying weaknesses in an argument which 
provide occasion for clarification, correction or further elaboration. The essays in this 
symposium do each of these things; and in this brief response—which I regard very much in 
the nature of a further contribution to a continuing dialogue, rather than as in any sense a 
definitive “reply”—I will pick out a handful of key issues emerging from each of the 
essays—some of them indeed arising across the contributions.  
 
I: Problematizing Progress Narratives Criminal Law, Power and Inequality 
 
In his elegant and incisive contribution, Ely Aaronson identifies three ways in which the 
argument of my book engages and problematizes a progress narrative which is explicit or, 
more often, implicit in much contemporary criminal law theory. His reconstruction of my 
argument, which generously situates it within a broader tradition in history and social theory, 
is immediately familiar to me, and his assessment is so fundamentally sympathetic that I find 
it very difficult to add anything by way of response. Yet it is worth saying that in framing his 
review around the (contested) notion of historical progress, Aaronson draws out something of 
which I was perhaps not fully aware as having had such a key position in my thinking. His 
interpretation helps me to understand the difficulty I found in balancing the need to organize 
the historical narrative which I presented within a set of developmental categories or broad 
periods, with the need to avoid that development seeming inevitable or necessarily tending 
towards progress or enlightenment. Criminal law, like all complex social institutions, 
develops unevenly; and, as Aaronson emphasizes, developments such as liberal conceptions 
of mens rea which are progressive from one point of view may be less so from another. A 
key example here, as both Aaronson and Blumenthal note, is the capacity of a formalized and 
doctrinally sophisticated set of legitimating principles which serve modern rule of law values 
to nonetheless obscure the power dynamics which imply the uneven impact of criminalizing 
power across the vectors of class, race and gender. But law’s form, in its evolving stages, 
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does indeed pose certain constraints as well as facilitating the exercise of legal power, and 
finding the right balance between a proper acknowledgment of the relatively autonomous 
dynamics of legal modalities and of the sway of extra-legal forces and interests in shaping the 
law’s development and exercise strikes me as one of the key methodological challenges for 
ambitious legal scholarship. I will return to this issue below. 
Aaronson also deftly identifies several important questions which my book raises, but 
does not resolve. Key among these is a question which is the object of an illuminating 
analysis in his own book:2 that of whether the undoubtedly genuinely progressive intentions 
of criminal law reformers over the centuries could have been more fully realized through 
different institutional or doctrinal arrangements, or whether criminal law’s inegalitarian 
dynamics are inevitable. To clarify, and without aspiring to make any real progress on that 
front here, let me say that I certainly do not want to turn away from the thought that criminal 
law and its doctrines can be reshaped in more or less progressive ways from a moral or 
political point of view, and should be framed in terms of values and ideals; indeed I am 
absolutely sympathetic to the thought that this normative project is one of the responsibilities 
of criminal law scholars.3 But I do believe very firmly that that ethical project must go 
forward on the basis of as complete as possible an understanding of the socio-historical 
forces which condition the implementation and impact, as much as the form and content, of 
criminal law. Aaronson is right to acknowledge that some of these forces—particularly those 
which realize themselves in discretionary powers of one kind or another—can be extremely 
difficulty to grasp, empirically, and to remind us that some matters are beyond our analysis. 
One good example is his persuasive suggestion that the incomplete institutionalization of 
capacity responsibility has been a product of budgetary constraints, via arrangements 
providing shortcuts to conviction, notably plea bargaining. It is hard to imagine how one 
would go about assessing the precise force of this motivation, or the strength of its perceived 
relationship with crime control and other imperatives among policy makers. But it seems to 
me that we should be slow to give up the attempt to glean what empirical insight we can, 
particularly in light of the increasingly sophisticated standards of socio-legal research training 
pertaining in much of the legal academy today. The big picture which I sketch in my book, in 
short, needs to be complemented by close-grained and particular socio-legal as well as 
historical research—indeed my own account could not have been constructed independent of 
the insights which I have gained from these genres of scholarship.  
 
II. Vectors of Power: Sexing the Subject of Criminal Law4 
 
While Aaronson notes that my analysis gives a central place to the question of how the sway 
of powerful extra-legal interests shapes the trajectory of criminal responsibility, Sharon 
Cowan’s “In Search of Connections” identifies a related (relative) silence in my book: and 
one about which I feel some perplexity. This is the question of gender, and of how gender 
dynamics have—or have not—shaped the conceptual structure and trajectory of criminal 
responsibility over time. I am particularly grateful to Cowan for this most exemplary instance 
of constructive critique, in which she imaginatively reconstructs my argument so as to draw 
out the connections between my analysis in this book and the feminist analyses of scholars 
such as Joanne Conaghan,5 Ngaire Naffine6 and Carol Smart7—each of whom have been key 
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influences on my own work over the years. It has spoken to me very directly, not least 
because I read it—fortuitously—just as I was working on the draft of a paper in which I 
attempt to bring the analysis of my earlier book, Women, Crime and Character,8 which traced 
the gender dynamics of criminal responsibility in law and literature from the early eighteenth 
to the late nineteenth century, up to the end of the twentieth century.  
Cowan is generous in suggesting that the relative absence of attention to questions of 
gender in In Search of Criminal Responsibility was a product of the fact that that book 
already had a rather ambitious—indeed some might say unmanageable!—agenda, and itself 
engaged with a wide range of questions and genres of scholarship. And it is certainly true 
that, particularly because I wanted to write a book which would be readable and hence not 
too cumbersome, I resorted to a relatively parsimonious “case studies” approach to 
elaborating the argument. This reduced the opportunity for engagement with substantive 
questions—as also noted by Aaronson and Blumenthal—about the precise ways in which 
vectors of power such as gender, race and class affect the idea and implementation of 
doctrines of responsibility at particular times. But Cowan is absolutely right to imply that I 
could have made more, conceptually, of feminist theory in this book, and that my own 
approach in Unspeakable Subjects9 would have tended in that direction. Even before I read 
her piece, I was subjecting myself to some fairly fierce cross-examination, as I drafted the 
new paper, as to why I had found it so hard to keep the feminist questions in view, and in 
effect exported them to a parallel set of projects. And I think there are some important lessons 
here. Perhaps the most obvious has to do with the constraining force of the literature with 
which one is primarily engaging—in this case, as Cowan notes, primarily a field of social 
theory and criminal law theory which remains heavily male-dominated. In this context, 
Cowan notes Sara Ahmed’s10 strategy of eschewing citation of white male authors. This 
strikes me as an imaginative piece of academic activism, as well as a timely reminder that 
any bibliography is itself a contribution to the construction of a canon, and hence an exercise 
in power. As such, it brings with it a responsibility to consider carefully decisions about both 
inclusion and exclusion. But Ahmed’s does not seem to me a generalizable practice, for a 
number of reasons. First, powerful ideas do not disappear because particular groups ignore 
them. Fields of scholarship always bear the marks of their history, which cannot be escaped, 
and we have a political as well as an intellectual duty to engage with that history. Second, the 
overriding responsibility of those of us privileged to work in the academy is to explore all the 
insights available to us; and exclusionary citation practices—whether deliberate or 
subconscious—seem to me to be fundamentally at odds with that aspiration.  
Returning to the substantive issue, it is fair to note the sheer intellectual challenge of 
keeping going at the work of exposing the underlying dynamics which implicitly shape the 
operations of legal power, and doing so against the grain of conventional scholarship. And 
there are, it is true, some advantages to focusing on specific dynamics or issues in particular 
parts of one’s work. But, given the synthetic ambition of In Search of Criminal Responsibility 
to draw the various dynamics which shape legal concepts’ development together, gender -as 
well as race and class—should have had a more prominent place, not least because my 
relatively brief treatment of gender risks obscuring an implicit gendering male of—
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particularly some—paradigms of responsibility. At the very least, I might have followed up 
my argument about the belated inclusion of women within legal conceptions of personhood 
with an additional case study illustrating the continuing force of gender assumptions in the 
judicial interpretation of responsibility—with cases on the defenses available to women who 
defend themselves against domestic violence just one example of a rich area for such a 
study.11 Similarly, the stark racial disparities in the use of imprisonment and of other state 
powers such as stop and search would have provided a pertinent case study in relation to 
racialized practices of responsibility-attribution set within the context of criminalization.12 
 
III. Complementing Historical Interpretation with a Comparative Perspective 
 
Michele Pifferi deftly puts his finger on another approach whose importance is acknowledged 
in my book, and which I might usefully have developed further: that of the comparative 
analysis of the trajectory of criminal responsibility over time in different systems. 
Comparative and historical scholarship offer complementary ways of illuminating the broad 
forces which shape the development of legal institutions and legal ideas, as well as of alerting 
us, through the perspective afforded by spatial or temporal distance and variation, to the 
contingency of arrangements which have become so familiar that we may no longer ask 
ourselves about their conditions of existence. As in the case of Cowan’s point about gender, I 
would like immediately to acknowledge the force of Pifferi’s argument that a comparative 
dimension would have enriched my analysis. Indeed my original plan for the book envisaged 
a comparative element setting the English trajectory in the context of those in the United 
States on the one hand and in Germany on the other. This selection of cases would have 
afforded further critical purchase on the causal hypotheses ventured, particularly in chapter 5, 
by enabling me to set them in the light of two systems with a range of cultural, institutional 
and political similarities and differences over the relevant period. In the end, the scale of the 
task even of putting together the historical analysis of England and Wales was such that I 
abandoned the comparative dimension, while noting its relevance and explanatory potential.13 
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Green’s Freedom and Criminal Responsibility in American Legal Thought (2014), which is 
mainly focused on ideas; and George Fletcher’s Rethinking Criminal Law (1978)—a book 
which Alessandro Spena rightly identifies as a key influence on my thinking—set U.S. and 
German developments in comparative dialogue. See also Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana 
Hörnle, Criminal Law: A Comparative Approach (2014). My own work in the political 
economy of punishment (The Prisoners’ Dilemma: Political Economy and Punishment in 
Contemporary Democracies (2008)) has taken a consistently comparative approach, on 
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So I am grateful to Pifferi for showing in his fine review just how fruitful such a comparison 
can be. I was particularly instructed by his illustration of the ways in which the earlier 
construction of a set of general doctrinal principles in countries of continental Europe such as 
Italy related to projects of state building and the constitution of sovereign authority—a theme 
which also resonates nicely with Lindsay Farmer’s argument, in his outstanding recent 
monograph, about the close relationship between criminalization and the formation of 
modern states.14 Pifferi’s insight about the relationship between the systematization of 
criminal law doctrines and the development of law faculties in universities is similarly 
significant, and is consistent with Farmer’s and my interpretations of the later emergence of 
systematized responsibility doctrines in England and Wales. A further insight provided by 
Pifferi, which my theoretical framework would readily embrace, is the way in which ideas—
such as ideas about criminal pathology and responsibility—travel across jurisdictions, where 
their impact is filtered through existing institutional structures, understandings and interests. 
Pifferi’s argument makes me wonder, though, whether I gave sufficient emphasis to the dual 
track ideas about responsibility or of the corresponding institutional arrangements for 
responsibility-attribution—a development which I did note, as of the late nineteenth century, 
but which a comparative dimension such as that provided in his recent book15 might have led 
me to develop as a more central part of my own account.  
 
IV. Critical Legal History, Contextualization and Criteria of Fit and Selection 
 
Like Pifferi, Susanna Blumenthal approaches my book, in significant part, from the 
perspective of history. While I make no claim to disciplinary expertise in history, I have 
learned a huge amount from historical scholarship; so I am really gratified that such 
distinguished legal historians see value in the conceptual framework developed in my book 
for historical scholarship, and I much appreciate the generosity with which they say so. 
Blumenthal quite rightly identifies the influence on my thinking of the critical legal history 
mapped out by scholars like Robert Gordon16—insights which I began to glimpse through 
discussions at a critical legal studies reading group in Oxford thirty years ago, but which did 
not really come to the surface of my thinking until I had the good fortune to work alongside 
Lindsay Farmer at Birkbeck College in the mid-1990s. And Blumenthal quite rightly sees as 
key to my approach an insistence on mapping out a middle path between a radical 
contingency thesis which might undermine the very enterprise of theorizing a specific 
concept or social practice, and the more conceptually fixed approach typical of analytical 
jurisprudence and moral or political philosophy. Blumenthal is, I think, sympathetic to this 
methodological aspiration, but as a meticulous historian herself,17 she very justly questions 
whether I have provided a thick enough characterization to establish the patterns of 
development which I identify, while also deftly putting her finger on the places at which the 
tensions inevitable in such a “middle path” approach surface in my narrative. For example, 
her argument that religion does not drop out of the picture, notwithstanding a degree of 
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secularization through the nineteenth century, is well taken, and although I did allude to this 
in my discussion of the lessons to be learned from Robert Louis Stevenson’s famous The 
Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (1886),18 Blumenthal is undoubtedly right that there 
is a great deal more to be said on this subject. It is also a fair observation that in a theory with 
as many moving parts as mine has, distinguishing cause from effect can be difficult—though 
my response would be that this a product of the real complexity of the world rather than 
necessarily a flaw in the model. Likewise, although—as I emphasize—ideas, interests and 
institutions are intimately interconnected, it seems an exaggeration to me to suggest that ideas 
and interests cannot be usefully distinguished for the purposes of the argument.  
Let me take in a little more detail three points on which Blumenthal raises really 
important issues with which I would like to engage. First, she argues that I do not always 
follow my own methodological injunctions—as for example in failing to note that the 
language of “responsibility” in fact postdates the establishment of what I have labelled a 
pattern of character responsibility attribution in English criminal law. Blumenthal is quite 
right to suggest that this raises some question about my claim to be taking a Wittgensteinian 
approach to language. On the other hand, given the absence of established doctrinal 
discourses structuring mid-eighteenth-century practices of attribution in most English 
criminal trials, any approach to, as Blumenthal puts it, “making sense” of the relevant 
practices is inevitably in the business of a form of reconstruction in conceptual terms which 
may not appear on the surface of the relevant practices. This raises deep methodological 
questions about which there is doubtless much more to be said. Second, Blumenthal makes 
the telling point that although I criticize analytic theories for losing sight of the key question 
of what criteria of accountability should hold between their theories and the phenomena 
which they theorize, my own approach is also parsimonious in its elaboration of those 
criteria. I want to acknowledge the importance of this point, and while I would maintain that 
the criteria of interpretive fit which I sketch and draw upon in the book are a real advance on 
the approach in much jurisprudence, there is productive scope for a much fuller discussion. 
So I am particularly grateful to her for this provocation to greater methodological 
development; it is one which would go to the core of the enterprise in which both of us are 
engaged. Finally, Blumenthal suggests that my contextualizing method, with its emphasis on 
change and contingency, may be corrosive of what she, like Aaronson and Cowan, sees as the 
normative concerns of my project. Clearly, from the point of view of an objective position in 
ethics, my approach in this book is unsatisfactory. But this does not concern me unduly, 
because I am of the view that our normative commitments are simply ones for which we have 
to argue, without the security of faith in an objectively existing ground independent of those 
arguments and commitments—but with a keen eye on the socio-economic and institutional 
preconditions for their realization (hence, once again, my resistance to the idea of a clear 
dichotomy between conceptual and historical/socio-legal analysis). The strength of 
Blumenthal’s point really lies elsewhere, in the claim that I should have done more to 
elaborate those commitments and, meshing with Aaronson’s point, to explore how far they 
might be met under the various historically existing constellations of power, ideology and 
institutional structure. 
 
V.  Interpretive Institutional History and Philosophical Analysis 
 
These last two concerns raised by Blumenthal also arise for Alessandro Spena, albeit from a 
different methodological direction. Spena approaches the assessment of my book from the 
perspective of a philosophically motivated criminal law theory; a method which places a very 
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high value on analytic rigor and coherence. From this point of view, he identifies two main 
problems with my account. First, he finds the categories within which I present the evolution 
of practices of criminal responsibility-attribution—particularly those distinguishing between 
capacity and character as the organizing ideas behind those practices—lacking coherence in 
that they include within their reach rather different approaches. Second, he is perplexed by 
my insistence that criminal responsibility is socially constructed around a relatively thin 
conceptual core which threads differently conceived and institutionalized versions together 
over time. In making these points, Spena, like Blumenthal, is touching on some of the key 
methodological debates of criminal law theory—indeed of legal theory more generally—
today, as well as some of the most important methodological commitments of my book. So I 
am very grateful to him for doing so so clearly and incisively, and for giving me the 
opportunity to sum up the key issues, as I see them. I doubt that what I can say here will 
convince him, but I do hope that it will clarify the points at issue between us. 
First, as Spena himself concedes, I make no secret of the fact that both my capacity 
and my character categories embrace strikingly different practices of attribution, as they have 
evolved and been institutionalized at different points in their history—and sometimes even at 
the same time, as competing interpretations struggle for dominance in treatises and court 
rooms, and often establish dominance over particular areas of the law. I am also happy to 
acknowledge—as Aaronson also notes—that the fair opportunity version of the capacity 
approach has some resonance with character approaches. I can do so because it is nonetheless 
the case that, as H.L.A. Hart’s classic statement19 makes so absolutely clear, this conception 
relates fundamentally to what counts as a truly agentic choice, and hence engages the values 
of agency which identify the capacity approach on my view. My judgment, overall, was that 
the character-capacity typologies were helpful in identifying distinctive impulses which may 
characterize the criminal law understood in the light of its principal social roles and 
preoccupations: the impulse to think about, and attribute, responsibility in terms of 
conditions pertaining in one way or another to agency; and that to do so in terms pertaining 
fundamentally to an evaluation of the character of the offender—whether inferred from 
individual actions or seen in terms of some conception of types or classes. So while I can 
appreciate both the conceptual elegance of, and the logic behind, Duff’s well known 
distinction between action-based and agent-based principles,20 I was simply making the 
judgment that, relative to my project of trying to produce a broad characterization and 
explanation of the development of English criminal responsibility over time, the character-
capacity typology shed new and greater light, for the reasons elaborated throughout the book.  
I imagine that Spena and I will have to agree to differ on this point, and I certainly do 
not want to claim that my theory is the only way of cutting the conceptual cake here. Nor do I 
mean to suggest that the questions he raises are anything other than key ones—as indeed the 
overlap between his concerns and those of Blumenthal suggests. But my ambition was not to 
produce another refined philosophical analysis of responsibility; rather, it was to try to 
capture something of the life of criminal responsibility conceived as a thoroughly 
institutionalized social phenomenon, nested within a complete set of institutional structures 
whose development in the context of the flux of interests and ideas is constantly driven by 
two key practical imperatives: the (increasing, under democratic conditions) need for 
criminal law to produce a narrative capable of legitimating its power; and the need to 
generate protocols coordinating the forms of knowledge which must be assembled precedent 
to a conviction; each of these imperatives being itself nested within a broad vision of criminal 
                                                     
19 H.L.A. Hart, A Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, 60 Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 1 (1959). 
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law as engaged in a project of governance, and hence intimately linked with the development 
of the modern state.  
This, if you like, functional and institutional approach—again, it is one which my 
work shares with that of other “contextualist” scholars like Lindsay Farmer21—also underpins 
my response to Spena’s second discomfort: that with my inclination to see the conceptual 
core of responsibility as relatively thin. As I argue at length in chapter 6, without an 
acknowledgment of the historicity of legal concepts such as responsibility, legal theory’s 
claim to be producing accounts “of” particular legal phenomena—as opposed to concepts of 
philosophical interest only—remains obscure. There is, of course, room for disagreement 
about just how thin the core concept needs to be; and, as Blumenthal points out, about just 
which features of a complex social institution should be regarded as core. But this dilemma, 
which I propose to resolve through a reflexive method, is one which analytical jurisprudence 
itself has to face—as indeed its less doctrinaire exponents, H.L.A. Hart key among them,22 
have long acknowledged. In short, while I have been an avid and often appreciative consumer 
of philosophically sophisticated legal theory throughout my career, my project in this book 
was a different one: and I am grateful to Spena for throwing these methodological differences 
into such sharp relief.  
 
 In conclusion: In a world in which widely stated claims about the declining important 
of nation states are belied by burgeoning criminalizing power in many countries, the 
explanatory and normative tasks of criminal law theory seem more important than ever. 
Happily, the intellectual tools which scholars are bringing to these tasks are ever more 
sophisticated, and the insights which are being generated by criminal law scholarship’s 
engagement with a range of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences suggest that the 
field is ripe for further development. So I would like to conclude by thanking each of the 
commentators for demonstrating this point with such insight and eloquence—and for 
responding to my book with the sort of generous scholarly imagination which has allowed 



















                                                     
21 See Farmer, supra note 12. 
22 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law chs. 1 & 10 (1961).  
